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Ted Becker,  
University of Michigan Law School
To increase my students’ exposure to statutory 
interpretation, I assign them early in the second semester 
to argue a motion to disqualify counsel based on 
imputed disqualification under Michigan’s ethics rules.1  
Interpreting ethics rules involves many of the same 
“pure” statutory interpretation techniques I introduced 
the previous semester, and the students appear to easily 
make any needed translations.  This exercise also helps 
prepare students to interpret other quasi-legislative 
authorities like court or evidentiary rules, administrative 
codes, and municipal ordinances.2
The assignment hinges on whether a firm timely 
screened a new associate to ensure that she did not 
reveal confidential client information obtained during 
a summer clerkship at a different employer in a matter 
in which her new firm represents an adverse party. 
Michigan explicitly allows screens of attorneys moving 
from firm to firm if certain conditions are met.3
We begin by walking through the language of the rule 
phrase by phrase to determine whether the firm is 
presumptively disqualified.  Students must think about 
what it means to “become associated” with a firm and 
about the definition of a “substantially related matter.”  
The language forces them to follow a cascade of cross-
references to other provisions to devise some tentative 
solutions.
Students must then formulate arguments about the 
timing question.  To help them along, I raise a common 
interpretative issue:  Did the drafters intend a bright-line 
rule that parties can easily follow, or a more open-ended 
but less predictable approach?  I also emphasize that 
even a supposedly clear bright-line test might not be all 
that “bright” when applied to a particular set of facts.  
Next, we identify whether either side can viably argue 
that such a bright-line test exists:
• Michigan does not explicitly provide that a screen 
must be imposed within a set time (such as one day 
or one week) after a new attorney joins a firm or any 
other specific triggering event.  Michigan does not 
even include a vague reference that screens must be 
“timely.”  Is there a “plain meaning” of the absence of 
any specific timing requirement?
• The rules also provide that after a screen is 
implemented, the firm must “promptly” notify an 
appropriate tribunal.  This suggests that the drafters 
knew how to impose a timing requirement when the 
mood struck them, so doesn’t the lack of any similar 
requirement for the screen itself further suggest that no 
such requirement exists?
• Or does the interpretative argument run the other 
way?  The preface to the screening requirement is 
phrased in the present tense (the firm “is disqualified 
. . . unless”); so does this suggest that the screen must 
be imposed immediately upon the firm’s discovery that 
the new associate is “infected” by her awareness of her 
ex-employer’s client’s confidential information? 
Any ethics-based problem will give rise to some general 
interpretative issues.  Most state ethics codes are based 
on the ABA’s Model Rules in a way analogous to 
statutory schemes based on uniform acts.  When a state 
modifies or declines to adopt some provisions of a model 
code, how does that affect the interpretation of the law as 
actually enacted?  For example, the Model Rules include 
an explanatory comment about whether imputed 
disqualification applies when the bearer of confidential 
information acquired that information while a law 
student.  Michigan’s rules say nothing about this.  The 
Model Rules specifically define “screened.”  Michigan 
does not.  What interpretations, if any, flow from these 
differences?
Using Ethics Codes to 
Reinforce Lessons of 
Statutory Interpretation
This exercise also helps prepare 
students to interpret other 
quasi-legislative authorities 
like court or evidentiary rules, 
administrative codes, and 
municipal ordinances.




From there, we turn to other interpretative questions:  
If the fact-finder has discretion to assess timing issues 
case by case, what factors should be considered?  Do 
the rules themselves identify any such considerations, 
either on their face or by reasonable inference?  Should 
students look to other timing requirements in the ethics 
rules to make arguments by analogy?  What about cases, 
ethics opinions, or secondary sources?  And, finally, 
how do these factors apply to the specific facts of the 
assignment?
As another general issue, the explanatory comments 
raise interesting questions of “legislative history,” 
because they are designed to “explain[] and illustrate[] 
the meaning and purpose” of the rules.  Yet the 
comments are only guides to meaning, and the text of 
the rules themselves is authoritative.  How can students 
use these comments to help support their interpretation 
of a given rule?
One such way is for the students to shore up their 
policy arguments.  Should a court err on the side of 
disqualification if there’s any doubt whether secrets 
could have been disclosed before a screen was 
imposed?  On the one hand, ensuring confidentiality 
of client secrets is a bedrock principle of the attorney/
client relationship.  On the other hand, interpreting the 
disqualification rules too strictly could hinder the ability 
of lawyers to move from firm to firm, and could be used 
as a litigation tactic to unfairly force opposing parties to 
be stripped of their chosen counsel. 
In sum, basing a brief writing assignment on ethics 
codes allows me to reinforce statutory interpretation 
techniques introduced the previous semester, plus drive 
home some ethical lessons about maintaining client 
confidentiality and how law firms try to avoid conflicts 
of interest.
1 The problem was originally created by my Michigan colleague Phil 
Frost.
2 For an article on a similar theme, see Amy Montemarano, Using Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to Teach Statutory Construction, 20 The Second 
Draft 9 (Dec. 2005).
3 Mich. R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(b).  By contrast, the ABA’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct do not formally authorize screens for lawyers 
moving laterally from firm to firm, and only allow screens in limited 
situations such as when government lawyers move to the private sector 
or when a prospective client reveals confidential information to an 
attorney during an initial interview.  See Model R. Prof. Conduct 1.11(b) 
& 1.18(d).
